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PICKETING IN SHOPPING CENTRES:
The Case of Harrison v. Carswell
By JoHN ULMER*
The split decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of
Harrison v. Carswell' is a singular example of the way in which progress in
the law of labour relations has too often been constrained by the application
of outmoded legal concepts to the policy issues that emerge in a rapidly
changing industrialized and urbanized society. The majority reasons for
judgment, delivered by Dickson, J., held than an employee in the course of
a legal strike was properly convicted under the Manitoba Petty Tres-
passes Act2 for peacefully picketing the premises of his employer located in
a privately owned shopping centre. Mr. Justice Dickson expressly refused to
come to grips with the competing societal interests raised by the issue of
labour picketing in shopping centres. Instead, the learned judge chose to be
bound by a somewhat less than convincing precedent,3 and in an unusually
introspective decision, he went on to discuss his interpretation of the limits
of the judicial function in Canada. In direct rebuttal, Chief Justice Laskin's
dissenting opinion, concurred in by Spence and Beetz, JJ., argues against
the use of an ancient doctrine such as trespass which, in the circumstances
of this case at least, is "a theory which does not square with economic or
social fact". 4 It is a compelling plea to the other members of the Supreme
Court to abandon mechanical deference to stare decisis and thereby to accept
the duty and the challenge of being the court of last resort.
The facts of the Carswell case are uncomplicated. A legal strike was
in progress against Dominion Stores Limited, which leased premises at the
Polo Park Shopping Centre in Winnipeg from the landlord-developer, the
Fairview Corporation Limited. Sophie Carswell, a striking employee of
Dominion Stores, was picketing on the sidewalk in front of the store build-
ing. Peter Harrison, manager of the shopping centre, warned the respondent
that she was on private property and asked her to leave. Carswell refused to
comply and continued to picket; subsequently, the police were called and
the respondent was charged with four offences (one for each of four days on
which she picketed) under the provincial Petty Trespasses Act upon informa-
tions sworn by the appellant, Harrison.
The Provincial Court Judge who originally heard the case held that in
the circumstances there was no trespass and dismissed the charges. That
* Mr. Ulmer is a student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
lUnreported, (decision handed down June 26, 1975) rev'g (1975), 48 D.L.R. (3d)
137 (Man. C.A.) sub. nom. R. v. Carswell.
2 R.S.M. 1970, c. P50.
3 Dickson, J., majority reasons, at 2.
4 Laskin, CJ.C., dissenting reasons, at 8.
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determination was reversed after a trial de novo in the County Court, and
the respondent was fined $10 for each offence. On appeal to the Manitoba
Court of Appeal, the convictions were set aside, and the present appeal fol-
lowed by leave to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The issue of whether or not picketing should be permitted on shopping
centre grounds is a classic case of the law being called upon to balance two
rival interests in society - the phrase the law being carefully chosen, for a
large part of the controversy in this case revolved around whether the
judiciary or the legislature could best perform this balancing function.
Strictly construed, the conflicting claims in shopping centre picketing are
the primacy of the private property rights of the landlord, against the ad-
vancement of the union's interests and the process of collective bargaining
generally by permitting the union to conduct its picketing at the most effec-
tive situs. The landlord of a shopping centre cannot be expected willingly to
open his sidewalks and malls to any and every person seeking to picket.
From his point of view, even slight obstructions would interfere with the
orderly flow of customers that yields his profits. On the other hand, to deny
the right of the employees to picket their employer's premises in a shopping
centre because the sidewalks are privately owned is effectively to preclude any
picketing at all in that labour dispute. Picketing on the adjoining roadways
is not only practically valueless, it could be enjoined as illegal economic
pressure against all of the shopping centre tenants.5
The underlying policy issues, of course, are much broader. Picketing
is a specific form of communication, intended to convey information about
a strike and, not incidentally, to gain public support in order to inflict eco-
nomic losses on the employer. The right to picket, therefore, has important
implications regarding freedom of speech. In fact, in the United States the
issue is invariably dealt with on the basis of the first amendment constitutional
guarantees.
In addition, there is the question of developing a more realistic con-
ception of the sanctity of property rights in the modem world. A shopping
centre extends a virtually unrestricted invitation to enter, and obviously
depends on a constant flow of people for its very existence. Trespass on the
'private' property of a shopping centre could occur in only the most technical
sense of the word. As one American court has said, it is "a property right
worn thin by public usage."0 The significant problem emerges, then, as to
whether society is entitled to expect that changing attitudes to property be
consistently reflected in the law. At a time when government regulation has
created numerous nonpossessory interests in land, it is somewhat incongruous
for a court to begin to preach the doctrine of absolute property rights. This
is particularly so in the circumstances of this case where it could be said that
it was a transparent disguise for a convenient way of disposing of a com-
plicated question in the law of labour relations.
5See Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein (1963), 38 D.L.R. (2d) 449 (Ont. CA.).
0 Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers'
Union, Local 31 (1964), 394 P. 2d 921 at 926.
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Admittedly, there is no easy answer to the problem of reconciling the
union's demands for an effective forum with the traditional protections offered
to the owner of private property. It would seem that the only rational ap-
proach would be to abandon the inflexible legal concepts that have generally
been invoked in analyzing shopping centre picketing. Certainly, the attempt
to assimilate what is clearly an important labour relations question into a
strict view of property law is unlikely to be useful. The history of trespass to
land is bound up with the need of an agricultural society to establish con-
tinuous and exclusive rights to the ownership of land. To apply this concept
today without allowances for the entirely different socio-economic realities
yields, in Chief Justice Laskin's words, "extravagant"7 results. To cite a
simplistic illustration, compare the interests of a shopping centre owner in
preventing the picketing of one of his tenants, and that of a person wishing to
enjoin picketing taking place on his front lawn. Clearly, the stake which
society as a whole has in the outcome of these two fact situations is vastly
different, and there is no reason why they should have the same legal result
simply because the kind of estate involved in both cases happens to be a fee
simple. By avoiding the attempt to pigeonhole the issue a workable solution
could be reached for each case along the spectrum, and guidelines set for the
resolution of future disputes. This is by no means an extraordinary role for
appeal courts to play.
Unfortunately this approach, parts of which were effectively put forth
by Freedman, C.J.M. in the decision handed down by the Manitoba Court of
Appeal in this case,8 did not find favour with the majority of the Supreme
Court in dealing with Harrison v. Carswell. Mr. Justice Dickson flatly asserted
that
the submission that this court should weigh and determine the respective values
to society of the right to property and the right to picket raise important and
difficult political and socio-economic issues, the resolution of which must, by
their very nature, be arbitrary and embody personal economic and social beliefs.0
With respect, this statement of what many would regard as a truism of
jurisprudence does little to conceal the fact that in choosing to do "nothing",
the Supreme Court has in fact seen fit to vindicate the property rights of the
shopping centre owner. The merits of that decision are of course debatable,
but surely it is not unreasonable to suggest that the interests of society in the
freedom of speech and the furtherance of the collective bargaining system de-
serve more consideration than they were given by Mr. Justice Dickson. Even
if in a particular instance it is found that the right to property is the pre-
dominant value, the dismissal of the countervailing interests as if it were
somewhat impetuous to have raised them is indefensible.
Dickson, J. based his decision on two grounds, precedent and the
mandatory language of the statute. Neither of these bases appears very satis-
7 Laskin, C.J.C., dissenting reasons, at 2.
sSee the majority opinion of Freedman, CJ.M.: (1975), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 137
(Man. C.A.) sub. nom. R. v. Carswell.
9 Dickson, J., majority reasons, at 7.
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factory on closer examination. Canadian case law on the subject of picketing
on private property is less than extensive, although in two decisions in the
early 1960's, the practice had apparently been sanctioned by the Appeal
Courts of British Columbia and Saskatchewan.' In Zeller's (Western) Ltd. v.
Retail Food and Drug Clerk's Union, Local 1518,11 the British Columbia
Court of Appeal reversed convictions for contempt arising out of the refusal
of striking employees to obey an injunction enjoining picketing obtained at
the suit of their employer - a tenant in a shopping centre - on the grounds
that the application was improperly based on nuisance. Davey, J.A. held that
as the picketing was lawful under the doctrine enunciated in Williams v.
Aristocratic Restaurants,'2 it could not be transformed into an unlawful
nuisance simply because it took place on property over which the employer
had an easement. The learned justice did suggest, however, that an action
in trespass might have been viewed more favourably. Less than a year later in
Grosvenor Park Shopping Centre v. Waloshin,13 a case more directly on
point, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside an injunction against
picketing granted to the landlord of a shopping centre, on the grounds that
although owner of the fee he could not maintain an action in trespass.
Culliton, C.J.S. also suggested that an alternate remedy might have been more
successful - this time in nuisance.
The combined effect of these decisions is hardly dramatic. Because the
policy implications of the case are not analyzed, there is no consideration
of the matter in the context of labour law. Moreover, the reasoning used to
arrive at the decisions exhibits the same tendency to be locked into con-
ceptual legal terminology without regard to the reality of the situation, which
is the major drawback of Mr. Justice Dickson's opinion. As such, although
Grosvenor Park was the first Canadian case to recognize that the public
character of a shopping centre ought to lead to a different legal result, the
court carried that discovery too far. In deciding that an owner of a shopping
centre did not have a sufficient degree of possession to bring an action in
trespass, the court created far more difficulties than it solved, for such an
allegation strikes at the roots of property law's notions of ownership. A more
fruitful analysis would concentrate not on the landlord's possession but on
the question of whether the actions complained of constitute a trespass in
view of the unrestricted invitation to enter and the social value of the
picketing.
The categorical rejection of a property owner's right to bring an action
in trespass, without any well-reasoned formulation of the competing claims
of public policy and private interest which led to that result in the particular
instance, was bound to be disputed in later cases. The reaction was, unfor-
10 See the comment on these two cases: H. Arthurs, Labour Law - Picketing in
Shopping Centres (1965), 43 C.B.R. 357.
11 (1964), 42 D.L.R. (2d) 582 (B.C.C.A.).
12 [1951] S.C.R. 762.
13 (1965), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 750 (Sask. C.A.).
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tunately, extreme. In R. v. Peters14, the controlling authority in Mr. Justice
Dickson's view, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that
an owner who has granted a right of entry to a particular class of the public
has not thereby relinquished his or its right to withdraw its invitation to the
general public or any particular member thereof, and that if a member of the
public whose invitation to enter has been withdrawn refuses to leave, he thereby
becomes a trespasser and may be prosecuted under the Petty Trespass Act.15
The Supreme Court of Canada, in a five-line decision that neither accepted
nor repudiated the reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal, agreed with
that determination of the case and dismissed the appeal, which had been
taken not at large, but only on two specific questions of law.16
Admittedly that statement, an unchallengeable tenet of property law a
few centuries ago, may still be a perfectly valid exposition of today's law
with respect to private dwellings. But to apply that formulation of the law
to a shopping centre is unreasonable. In the following portion of his dis-
senting opinion in Carswell, one can sense the exasperation with that position
felt by Chief Justice Laskin:
What does a shopping centre owner protect, for what invaded interest of his
does he seek vindication in ousting members of the public from sidewalks and
roadways and parking areas in the shopping centre? There is no challenge to his
title and none to his possession nor to his privacy when members of the public
use those amenities. Should he be allowed to choose what members of the public
come into those areas when they have been opened to all without discrimination?
Human rights legislation would prevent him from discriminating on account of
race, colour or creed or national origin, but counsel for the appellant would have
it that members of the public can otherwise be excluded or ordered to leave by
mere whim. It is contended that it is unnecessary that there be a reason that can
stand rational assessment. Disapproval of the owner, in assertion of a remote
control over the 'public' areas of the shopping centre, whether it be disapproval
of picketing or disapproval of the wearing of hats or anything equally innocent,
may be converted (so it is argued) into a basis of ouster of members of the
public. Can the common law be so devoid of reason as to tolerate this kind of
whimsy where public areas of a shopping centre are concerned?' 7
What the Chief Justice is saying is simply that the law can recognize limits
to the ability of a landowner to invoke the remedy of trespass without neces-
sarily impugning his ownership of the fee. As that position is crucial to a
critical analysis of Mr. Justice Dickson's interpretation of the statute, the
discussion of precedent will be put aside for a moment.
14 (1971), 17 D.L.R. (3d) 128 (S.C.C.) aff'g (1971), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 143 (Ont.
C.A.).
15R. v. Peters (1971), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 143 at 146.
16The second question related to the constitutional validity of the provincial tres-
pass act, and has no relevance to the Carswell case. The first question quoted by Dick-
son, J. at p. 2 of the majority reasons, read:
Did the learned judges in Appeal err in law in determining that the owner of the
property had sufficient possession of the shopping plaza sidewalk to be capable
of availing itself of the remedy for trespass under The Petty Trespass Act, R.S.O.
1960, C. 294, S. 1(1)?
17 Laskin, CJ.C., dissenting reasons, at 8-9.
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Dickson, J. contended that the Manitoba Petty Trespasses Act em-
bodies a statutory policy which ought to be altered only by the legislature.
That position, of course, has great merit; and at first glance, the Act seems
to leave little room for judicial mancuvring. But on further reflection it is
arguable that such a view makes sense only if one has made a predetermina-
tion that a trespass has actually been committed. Obviously, to evaluate
fairly the interests of both the picketer and the shopping centre owner, one
must at least recognize that rather than being a given fact, the existence of a
trespass is the central issue in the case. Section 2 of the Petty Trespasses Act
deals with "unlawful trespass" only. In order to constitute a trespass under
the Act, the entry into enclosed land or, failing that, land "upon or through
which he has been requested by the owner, tenant or occupier not to enter,
come or pass.. ." must be unlawful. In other words, liability follows only an
unjustified invasion of the exclusive possession of the owner or occupier. The
Act expressly sets out the defence of colour of right. Public and even private
necessity would probably be valid defences as well. As Laskin, C.I.C. pointed
out in the passage just quoted, a landowner who extends a general invitation
to the public to enter, would thereby have relinquished his right to withdraw
the invitation on the grounds of racial or religious discrimination. Clearly the
limits to the protection to be afforded to a landowner must be set by the
law; and even though common law trespass has been codified as an offence,
it is still up to the courts to interpret the statute so as to determine what
constitutes an unlawful entry against which the law will supply a remedy. To
do so, of necessity, involves the court in an assessment of the impact of its
decision on the affected interests in society.
For these reasons, it is difficult to justify the lack of policy analysis in
the judgment of Dickson, J. The statute is not the absolute prohibition which
he considers it to be, nor are the precedents especially valuable. In par-
ticular, the case which he considers to be controlling authority could be
easily and logically distinguished. With respect, it does not seem fair to say,
as did Mr. Justice Dickson, that the cases of Peters and Carswell arose out
of the same fact situation. Carswell was an employee engaged in peaceful
picketing during the course of a legal strike. The defendant in Peters was
the President of the Brampton Labour Council; the incident giving rise to his
conviction for trespass was an appeal to boycott a supermarket which sold
California grapes. If one adopts the analysis postulated at the beginning of
this comment, it will be readily seen that this situation does not present
nearly as pressing a case for legal protection as does Sophie Carswell's. With-
out overcomplicating the question with the issue of secondary picketing, this
is so for two reasons. Although Peters involved an issue pertaining to an
important matter of labour relations, it was not a labour relations dispute.
Because of this, the benefit of the argument that prevention of effective
picketing would detract from the collective bargaining process is lost. With
it goes much of the stake society has in permitting the picketing on private
property, for once the identification with a specific objective of public policy
is gone, the picketers must fall back on the more general claim of a civil right
to protest. The second point distinguishing Peters is the availability of an
alternative forum. The boycotting of California grapes was a public issue,
and there was no vital reason why protesting with placards had to take place
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on the shopping centre owner's sidewalks. As far as Carswell was concerned,
on the other hand, there was no other place to go. The Peters case, therefore,
could be read as covering the situation of the public protester only, not that
of the legal striker. In fact, Laskin, C.1.C. called it unfair to consider the
Ontario Court of Appeal's statement in Peters out of the context of its factual
background.18 Finally, the Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal in Peters
was in answer to a narrowly-framed question of law. There was no discussion
whatsoever of the facts or of the policy considerations involved. Two of the
justices sitting on the court that heard that appeal, Spence, J. and Laskin, J.
(as he then was), dissented in the Carswell case, pointing out that the brief
reasons for judgment in Peters would not have sufficed if the case actually
stood for the legal point for which it had been cited in the majority opinion.
The Chief Justice goes on to suggest that the simple fact of their disagree-
ment "should give pause to any suggestion that the Peters case has concluded
the issue now before us."' 9
In sum, Carswell was an unusual occasion for Mr. Justice Dickson to
become the champion of stare decisis. Adherence to precedent ought not to
be used as a substitute for an evaluation of the socio-economic issues at
stake when the authorities relied on yield so little in terms of logical analysis.
Chief Justice Laskin expressed concern with the adoption of a "timorous"
and "mechanistic" approach in the application of precedent. He would much
prefer, I believe, that the Supreme Court follow Lord Denning's exhortation
in Dutton v. Bognor Regis:
It seems to me that it is a question of policy which we, as judges, have to decide.
The time has come when, in cases of new import, we should decide them accord-
ing to the reason of the thing.Ao
What this means is not that all respect for precedent be abandoned, but that
the principles of law upon which the prior case was decided be carefully
assessed before they are found to be conclusive in another case. In the
Supreme Court at least, precedent ought to be the servant of judicial reason-
ing, not its master.
What, then, are the alternative approaches to shopping centre picketing?
The United States provides a valuable source of comparison in spite of the
differing constitutional framework. The California Supreme Court supplied
the first complete analysis of the problem in the Schwartz-Torrance Invest-
ment Corp.2 case. There, the court found that the interest of the state in
encouraging collective bargaining was greater than the purely technical in-
vasion of the shopping centre owner's private property. That reasoning was
affirmed in the United States Supreme Court decision in Logan Valley.22 The
language in that case drew analogies between the public business district and
181d. at 3.
19Id. at 5.
20 [1972] 2 W.L.R. 299 at 313.
21 Supra, note 6.
2 2 Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza Inc. (1968), 391
U.S. 308.
19751
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
its modem functional equivalent, the shopping centre. But even with the
extreme importance attached to first amendment rights, the United States
Supreme Court saw that limits on the use of shopping centres as forums for
free speech must be drawn. In the 1971 decision of Lloyd Corp. v. Tannerm
the court first asserted its right to examine carefully whether the private
property urged as a public forum in fact fulfilled that role, and went on
to prescribe two major tests as conditions precedent to the court's intervention
to protect the activity: first, it must be shown that suitable alternative forums
are not available, and second, that the activity bears a direct relation to the
use to which the private property is being put. Applying those tests, the court
held that persons who attempted to distribute handbills on the grounds of a
shopping centre urging attendance at a political rally to protest the draft and
the war in Vietnam, could properly be excluded as trespassers, without over-
ruling its previous decision to permit peaceful picketing by employees during
a labour dispute.
A position roughly analogous to this would have been reached in Can-
ada, had the Manitoba Court of Appeal's decision in Carswell not been re-
versed. Freedman, C.J.M. began his analysis from the premise that a shop-
ping centre owner's use of his remedy in trespass was subject to judicial
control. Thus he held that whereas trespass could clearly be invoked against
"a wrongdoer engaged in some illegal activity" and, following Peters, a per-
son engaged in "gratuitous" protest, if the picketer is engaged in a legal strike
with a tenant employer in the shopping centre no actionable trespass has
been committed.2
A rationale for the underlying policy of these instances was supplied by
Chief Justice Laskin in his dissenting opinion in the present case. The learned
justice found that those members of the public who respond to the shopping
centre owner's general invitation to enter have "a continuing privilege in
using the areas of the shopping centre provided for public passage,"25  which
would avoid liability by constituting a defence to an otherwise valid action
in trespass. The usefulness of this concept is its flexibility. This is perhaps
best evident from the description of privilege cited by the Chief Justice from
Prosser's treatise on the Law of Torts:
[The defendant] is allowed freedom of action because his own interests, or those
of the public require it, and social policy will best be served by permitting it.
The boundaries of the privilege are marked out by current ideas of what will
most effectively promote the general welfare.26
The learned justice did not commit himself to an elaborate discussion of what
these limits should be, though he did indicate that aside from a general pro-
hibition against any material damage, they would be determined by reference
to both the nature of the activity and its object. "In the present case", he
23 (1972), 407 U.S. 551.
24R. v. Carswell (1975), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 137 at'138.
25 Laskin, C.1., dissenting reasons, at 12.
20 Prosser, Law of Torts (1971), 4th ed.) at 98, cited in Laskin, CJ.C., dissenting
reasons, at 12.
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concluded, "it is [Sophie Carswell] who has been injured rather than the
shopping centre owner."
27
Chief Justice Laskin's dissenting judgment is representative of the kind
of sophisticated judicial reasoning seen too infrequently in Canadian juris-
prudence. Recognizing that new social facts have rendered older concepts
inapplicable, he set out on "a search for an appropriate legal framework"28
in which direction the law could develop free of the constraints set out at a
time when the fabric of society was essentially different. It is this constant
reshaping of legal principles in order to apply them to new situations which,
it has been said again and again, is the genius of the common law. The
growth of labour organization in particular has forced changes in many of
the more solidly entrenched areas of the law.
29
The case of Harrison v. Carswell is perhaps most interesting for the
dramatic way in which it demonstrates how the resolution of a relatively
simple issue can touch on some of the vital conflicts of our time. Against the
historical background of the shifting of the balance of power between capital
and labour, one finds the pressing need for the law to evolve. On another level,
these constant challenges to age-old doctrines are reflected in the philosophy
of the law, particularly in its attitudes to precedent and to the role of the
judge as law-maker. Finally, on a more personalized level, there is the grow-
ing polarization between individual judges on issues fundamental to the
structuring of society. With this in mind, one can sympathize with the dif-
ficulties Mr. Justice Dickson found with this case, although disagreeing with
his conclusion. We can only join him in asking "What are the limits of the
judicial function?"
27 Laskin, CJ.C., dissenting reasons, at 14.
28
1d. at 10.
29 The abandonment of the use of the industrial tort of conspiracy to curb normal
trade union activities in the famous Crofter's case [Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed
Co. v. Veitch, [1942] A.C. 435 (H.L.)l is but one example of the inevitable evolution
of the common law in the changed circumstances of the twentieth century. See W.
Friedman, Law in a Changing Society (2d ed. New York: Columbia University Press,
1972) at 54.
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